iSoul In the beginning is reality

Capitalism and socialism

Wikipedia notes: The initial usage of the term capitalism in its modern sense has been attributed to Louis Blanc [a socialist] in 1850 and Pierre-Joseph Proudhon [an anarchist] in 1861. Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels referred to the capitalistic system (kapitalistisches System) and to the capitalist mode of production (kapitalistische Produktionsform) in Das Kapital (1867). The use of the word “capitalism” in reference to an economic system appears twice in Volume I of Das Kapital, p. 124 (German edition), and in Theories of Surplus Value, tome II, p. 493 (German edition). Marx did not extensively use the form capitalism, but instead those of capitalist and capitalist mode of production, which appear more than 2600 times in the trilogy Das Kapital.

In short, socialists invented capitalism, which is to say, they invented an ideology as a foil for their ideology. Once we step outside the ideology of socialism we do not find the ideology capitalism but instead economic liberty and attempts to deny economic liberty. Socialism is an ideology which (among other things) attempts to deny economic liberty and in its place implement an ideology called socialism.

Ideologies are inherently idealist in the philosophical sense of asserting that reality is mental or immaterial. Most ideologues are idealists as the words would imply, but some – notably Karl Marx – claimed to be materialists. Either way, ideologies are inherently anti-realist.

Realists (at least as realists) do not promote ideologies but instead independent realities that are discovered, not invented. Economic liberty was gradually discovered and matured into modern markets and finance. Over time it is inevitable that some people will accumulate more wealth than others as long as economic liberty allows people to express their talents and inclinations. That can cause social problems which may legitimate state intervention.

That is not an endorsement of the ideology socialism but a recognition of the complementarity of liberty and equality in society. A realist response on how to reconcile these two priorities would follow a dialectic of complementarity to find a satisfactory mean between the extremes. Instead what many societies are dealing with is a dialectic of contradiction which tries for an extreme of liberty or (more often) equality alone. This is a prescription for instability, unsustainability, and worse.

History of science via Ngrams

Google’s Ngram Viewer is a fascinating look at word usage since about 1800. For example, the story of how the term natural history declined and the terms biology and geology increased is told in a simple chart. Let’s look at the etymologies first, via the Online Etymology Dictionary:

biology (n.) 1819, from Greek bios “life” (see bio-) + -logy. Suggested 1802 by German naturalist Gottfried Reinhold Treviranus (1776-1837), and introduced as a scientific term that year in French by Lamarck.

The usage of biology rises steadily from the mid-19th century to today, with a pause during the Depression.

geology (n.) 1795 as “science of the past and present condition of the Earth’s crust,” from Modern Latin geologia “the study of the earth,” from geo– “earth” + logia (see -logy). In Medieval Latin, geologia (14c.) meant “study of earthly things,” i.e. law, as distinguished from arts and sciences, which concern the works of God.

The modern usage of geology rises in the early 19th century and levels off.

As Wikipedia notes: The English term “natural history” is a translation of the Latin historia naturalis. Its meaning has narrowed progressively with time. Natural history has its heyday in the early 19th century and then declines and levels off since 1920.

The usage of evolution rises slowly in the early 19th century, and then quickly from 1860 to the 1890s, peaks around 1920, drops lower in the 1930s and has been rising since the 1950s. Perhaps the dip has to do with (American) textbooks in the 1930s avoiding the word evolution (see Textbook History).

Special creation never comes near the usage that biology and geology have, which reminds us that it was never a particular theory but only a general understanding of how the creation must be. Its usage peaked around 1890, which is not surprising as it was (and is) used as a foil for evolution.

Creationism was rare before the 1860s, then still uncommon even when its usage jumped in the 1980s and leveled off. Intelligent design is less common, with a modest peak in the 1880s and a rise since the 1990s. Its component word design bottomed out in the 1890s, when it rose until the 1990s and leveled off.

Consensus science

Michael Crichton, a well-known scientist and author, delivered the Caltech Michelin Lecture on January 17, 2003. He entitled it “Aliens Cause Global Warming” which criticized what is called “consensus science” starting with SETI. A few excerpts:

I want to pause here and talk about this notion of consensus, and the rise of what has been called consensus science. I regard consensus science as an extremely pernicious development that ought to be stopped cold in its tracks. Historically, the claim of consensus has been the first refuge of scoundrels; it is a way to avoid debate by claiming that the matter is already settled.

He went on:

Let’s be clear: the work of science has nothing whatever to do with consensus. Consensus is the business of politics. Science, on the contrary, requires only one investigator who happens to be right, which means that he or she has results that are verifiable by reference to the real world. In science consensus is irrelevant. What is relevant is reproducible results. The greatest scientists in history are great precisely because they broke with the consensus.

He presented several examples of the record of consensus science, including the rejection of the infectious cause of puerperal fever for 125 years, the dietary cause of pellagra for years, the existence of continental drift for 50 years, and then states:

The examples can be multiplied endlessly. Jenner and smallpox, Pasteur and germ theory. Saccharine, margarine, repressed memory, fiber and colon cancer, hormone replacement therapy. The list of consensus errors goes on and on.

Finally, I would remind you to notice where the claim of consensus is invoked. Consensus is invoked only in situations where the science is not solid enough. Nobody says the consensus of scientists agrees that E=mc2. Nobody says the consensus is that the sun is 93 million miles away. It would never occur to anyone to speak that way.

His words get stronger:

Once you abandon strict adherence to what science tells us, once you start arranging the truth in a press conference, then anything is possible. In one context, maybe you will get some mobilization against nuclear war. But in another context, you get Lysenkoism. In another, you get Nazi euthanasia. The danger is always there, if you subvert science to political ends.

He goes over the pseudo-consensus about “nuclear winter” promoted by Carl Sagan and others, then says:

I believe the lesson was that with a catchy name, a strong policy position and an aggressive media campaign, nobody will dare to criticize the science, and in short order, a terminally weak thesis will be established as fact. After that, any criticism becomes beside the point. The war is already over without a shot being fired.

This happened with the campaign against “second-hand smoke” too:

As with nuclear winter, bad science is used to promote what most people would consider good policy. I certainly think it is. I don’t want people smoking around me. So who will speak out against banning second-hand smoke? Nobody, and if you do, you’ll be branded a shill of RJ Reynolds. A big tobacco flunky. But the truth is that we now have a social policy supported by the grossest of superstitions. And we’ve given the EPA a bad lesson in how to behave in the future. We’ve told them that cheating is the way to succeed.

As the twentieth century drew to a close, the connection between hard scientific fact and public policy became increasingly elastic. In part this was possible because of the complacency of the scientific profession; in part because of the lack of good science education among the public; in part, because of the rise of specialized advocacy groups which have been enormously effective in getting publicity and shaping policy; and in great part because of the decline of the media as an independent assessor of fact. The deterioration of the American media is dire loss for our country. When distinguished institutions like the New York Times can no longer differentiate between factual content and editorial opinion, but rather mix both freely on their front page, then who will hold anyone to a higher standard?

And so, in this elastic anything-goes world where science—or non-science—is the hand maiden of questionable public policy, we arrive at last at global warming. It is not my purpose here to rehash the details of this most magnificent of the demons haunting the world. I would just remind you of the now-familiar pattern by which these things are established. Evidentiary uncertainties are glossed over in the unseemly rush for an overarching policy, and for grants to support the policy by delivering findings that are desired by the patron. Next, the isolation of those scientists who won’t get with the program, and the characterization of those scientists as outsiders and “skeptics” in quotation marks—suspect individuals with suspect motives, industry flunkies, reactionaries, or simply anti-environmental nut-cases. In short order, debate ends, even though prominent scientists are uncomfortable about how things are being done.

He continues:

To an outsider, the most significant innovation in the global warming controversy is the overt reliance that is being placed on models. Back in the days of nuclear winter, computer models were invoked to add weight to a conclusion: “These results are derived with the help of a computer model.” But now, large-scale computer models are seen as generating data in themselves. No longer are models judged by how well they reproduce data from the real world—increasingly, models provide the data. As if they were themselves a reality. And indeed they are, when we are projecting forward. There can be no observational data about the year 2100. There are only model runs.

This fascination with computer models is something I understand very well. Richard Feynmann called it a disease. I fear he is right. Because only if you spend a lot of time looking at a computer screen can you arrive at the complex point where the global warming debate now stands.

And then says:

Stepping back, I have to say the arrogance of the model-makers is breathtaking. There have been, in every century, scientists who say they know it all. Since climate may be a chaotic system—no one is sure—these predictions are inherently doubtful, to be polite. But more to the point, even if the models get the science spot-on, they can never get the sociology. To predict anything about the world a hundred years from now is simply absurd.

He then points out:

What is clear, however, is that on this issue, science and policy have become inextricably mixed to the point where it will be difficult, if not impossible, to separate them out. It is possible for an outside observer to ask serious questions about the conduct of investigations into global warming, such as whether we are taking appropriate steps to improve the quality of our observational data records, whether we are systematically obtaining the information that will clarify existing uncertainties, whether we have any organized disinterested mechanism to direct research in this contentious area.

The answer to all these questions is no. We don’t.

He makes a suggestion:

Just as we have established a tradition of double-blinded research to determine drug efficacy, we must institute double-blinded research in other policy areas as well. Certainly the increased use of computer models, such as GCMs, cries out for the separation of those who make the models from those who verify them. The fact is that the present structure of science is entrepreneurial, with individual investigative teams vying for funding from organizations that all too often have a clear stake in the outcome of the research—or appear to, which may be just as bad. This is not healthy for science.

Sooner or later, we must form an independent research institute in this country. It must be funded by industry, by government, and by private philanthropy, both individuals and trusts. The money must be pooled, so that investigators do not know who is paying them. The institute must fund more than one team to do research in a particular area, and the verification of results will be a foregone requirement: teams will know their results will be checked by other groups. In many cases, those who decide how to gather the data will not gather it, and those who gather the data will not analyze it. If we were to address the land temperature records with such rigor, we would be well on our way to an understanding of exactly how much faith we can place in global warming, and therefore with what seriousness we must address this.

He concludes:

In recent years, much has been said about the post-modernist claims about science to the effect that science is just another form of raw power, tricked out in special claims for truth-seeking and objectivity that really have no basis in fact. Science, we are told, is no better than any other undertaking. These ideas anger many scientists, and they anger me. But recent events have made me wonder if they are correct. We can take as an example the scientific reception accorded a Danish statistician, Bjorn Lomborg, who wrote a book called The Skeptical Environmentalist.

The scientific community responded in a way that can only be described as disgraceful. In professional literature, it was complained he had no standing because he was not an earth scientist. His publisher, Cambridge University Press, was attacked with cries that the editor should be fired, and that all right-thinking scientists should shun the press. The past president of the AAAS wondered aloud how Cambridge could have ever “published a book that so clearly could never have passed peer review.” (But of course, the manuscript did pass peer review by three earth scientists on both sides of the Atlantic, and all recommended publication.) But what are scientists doing attacking a press? Is this the new McCarthyism—coming from scientists?

Worst of all was the behavior of the Scientific American, which seemed intent on proving the post-modernist point that it was all about power, not facts. The Scientific American attacked Lomborg for eleven pages, yet only came up with nine factual errors despite their assertion that the book was “rife with careless mistakes.” It was a poor display, featuring vicious ad hominem attacks, including comparing him to a Holocaust denier. The issue was captioned: “Science defends itself against the Skeptical Environmentalist.” Really. Science has to defend itself? Is this what we have come to?

 And finally:

Further attacks since, have made it clear what is going on. Lomborg is charged with heresy. That’s why none of his critics needs to substantiate their attacks in any detail. That’s why the facts don’t matter. That’s why they can attack him in the most vicious personal terms. He’s a heretic.

And:

Is this what science has become? I hope not. But it is what it will become, unless there is a concerted effort by leading scientists to aggressively separate science from policy.

This is an important lecture — and things have only become worse since it was delivered in 2003. I could add a related example I know about when I worked for the Department of Energy: a 10-year study of acid rain concluded that the leaching ability of lakes and rivers was sufficient so its effects were small. But the study was irrelevant since the legislation regulating the “smokestack industries” had already been passed and politicians had “moved on”.

Paul Feyerabend called for the separation of science and state but science today is wedded to the state because the state provides the bulk of the funding (directly or indirectly) for science education, scientific facilities, and scientific research. The politicization of science follows that as a matter of course.

Also, this kind of demonization of scientific heretics continues with the demonization of critics of evolutionism. It’s really political heresy that is the key at this point but the scientific consensus fully supports and is supported by the political establishment (notwithstanding occasional Republican hedging).

Creationist argumentation

Petteri Nieminen et al. have written two similar papers analyzing creationist writings: Argumentation and fallacies in creationist writings against evolutionary theory (Evolution: Education and Outreach, 2014, 7:11) and Experiential Thinking in Creationism–A Textual Analysis (PLOS ONE, March 3, 2015). These are welcome additions to the literature that try to shed some light and reduce the heat of debate. They also show some reasons for the impasse today.

First, they are studies of creationists but do not try to engage their arguments despite the fact that some fully credentialed and experienced scientists in peer-reviewed journals are arguing for creationism. Second, the authors select a non-random sample of texts and then make generalized conclusions — a blatant case of sample bias. Third, the authors ignore the fact that many texts in the creation-evolution debate are written for a general audience and then criticize the texts for not being sufficiently scientific (they also criticize a few pro-evolution texts).

That said, the articles are helpful in illuminating some poor or weak arguments on all sides. The ad hominem arguments are much too common (and I’d say rarely persuade anyone not already persuaded). Other arguments may have a place in a public debate but are inappropriate for a narrow scientific context. The use of quotations is an example of this.

But the authors seem unaware that at those points where “normal science” (Thomas Kuhn’s phrase) is challenged, then “anything goes” (Paul Feyerabend’s phrase), that is, any method of argumentation that works is part of the scientist’s arsenal — Darwin’s “bulldog” Thomas Huxley being a notable example.

This is my greatest disappointment with defenders of evolution — they act as if all the opposing arguments have been duly considered in the past, when that is simply false as a matter of historical record. The 19th century had its peculiarities, which prevented many arguments about creation and intelligent design from being considered. Those arguments are finally being made and the debate is on, like it or not.

Remodern science

Remodernism is a growing movement of artists and filmmakers who oppose post-modernism and its cynical and ironic attitudes and seek to renew the vision of early modernism, emphasizing the spiritual and expressive dimensions of art. See their manifesto here. What is interesting is the rejection of late modernism and its denouement in post-modernism. Something similar may be happening in science.

In art, modernism began in the early 20th century. In culture generally, modernism goes back further, at least to the early 19th century, as with Paul Johnson’s The Birth of the Modern: World Society 1815-1830. Modern science is often considered to begin with Galileo and Newton in the 17th century. Later, in the 19th century science separated from philosophy and the humanities, joined the practical arts, and became professionalized and institutionalized.

Science in the 20th century became an industry doing the bidding of the state and its political regime. As state secularism became more and more state-sponsored atheism, materialism, and evolutionism, so science became more and more meaningless. Instead of trying to understand nature, science focused on mere manipulation of nature and the technological imperative (“if it can be built, it must be built”).

People are more and more opposed to this dominant science as it carries water for the political class and promotes a post-modern view of life that makes knowledge worthless and the search for truth impossible. One answer is to return to the vision of early modernity with their authentic search for truth. Intelligent design and neo-creationism are part of this remodern approach which seeks to reconnect science with the humanities and with theology.

Midocracy

The problems with the two extremes of government are well known. Monarchy, oligarchy, aristocracy, plutocracy, and the like are all forms of government in which one person or a small group of people have almost all the authority, land, power, wealth, etc. The problem is that either they are not necessarily wise or competent or benevolent so that the resulting government is generally corrupt and serves the self-interest of the few rather than the interest of the many.

On the other hand the problems of democracy are also well-known, even if they are forgotten or over-shadowed by ideals of egalitarianism or libertarianism. As the ancient Greek democracies show, people exploit the public purse for private purposes, until bankruptcy ends the game. Unfortunately, poor people are inclined to vote for those who give them the most rather than consider the interest of the whole.

The solution to this lacks a word, so I’ll invent one: midocracy, rule of the middle class. The richest and most powerful people should be excluded from voting and ruling since their self-interest is too much for perpetuating their dominance rather than considering the welfare of the whole. The poorest and least powerful people should also be excluded from voting and ruling since their self-interest is too much for undermining the higher classes and impoverishing the whole.

The solution is to let the middle class alone vote and rule. Their interests are balanced between maintaining stability while allowing some change and using of the public purse for some public purposes. The middle class is the most balanced between stability and change, spending and saving, private and public interests. A healthy middle class is the best guarantee of freedom and justice, peace and prosperity for the long term.

Two kinds of evolution

It is not well known that there are two kinds of evolutionary theories, characterized by whether law or chance are the dominant means. For Darwinism chance is the dominant means, that is, stochastic elements are more significant than the processes of physical law. A different kind of evolution asserts that physical law is the dominant means so that the chance elements are necessarily channeled into certain results. We might call these stochastic evolution and nomothetic evolution.

Michael Denton’s book Nature’s Destiny: How the Laws of Biology Reveal Purpose in the Universe presents a nomothetic version of evolution. This is directed evolution, that is, evolution directed by physical law. It is consistent with evolution as described by Herbert Spencer in the 19th century. Darwinism in contrast is undirected evolution.

These two kinds of evolution have been confused since the 19th century. Many who supported Darwin in the 19th century thought he was promoting nomothetic evolution. To this day theistic evolutionists say that evolution is somehow directed, even as they affirm Darwinism. The ID researchers are right to call out this contradiction.

The second-order question is, How do law and chance work together? All evolutionists can say is that it’s “chance all the way down” or “law all the way down.” This is a way of kicking the can down the road rather than answering it head-on.

But there is a third possibility: a combination of law and chance superintended by intelligence. This is a form of design which is anathema to evolutionists. Yet design does answer the second-order question.

Design resources

William Paley’s Natural Theology makes some important points:

Whatever is done, God could have done, without the intervention of instruments or means: but it is in the construction of instruments, in the choice and adaptation of means, that a creative intelligence is seen. It is this which constitutes the order and beauty of the universe. God, therefore, has been pleased to prescribe limits to his own power; and to work his ends within those limits. (p.27)

There is no design if there are no choices, means, and limits. As long as the universe exhibits limits and means, we can discern choices and therefore a chooser, a designer. But if there is an unlimited resource, then design is not needed.

Say, for example, that someone has a virtually unlimited budget to make a car that drives itself. Then they could throw money at almost any idea and expect that something might eventually work. When something is found that happens to work, people would see design in it but from the perspective of the wealthy buyer, it would be mere happenstance.

Something like this happened with the discovery (or invention) of deep time. Instead of time being confined to history, Bursting the Limits of Time by Martin Rudwick shows how time became a vast resource for scientific explanation. It was inevitable that the argument from design was replaced by chance operating with virtually unlimited time.

But all explanatory elements have limits and “costs”. A scientific explanation should optimize the use of resources for explanation. Otherwise, a virtually unlimited resource (e.g., time) will flood the market for explanations (cf. Gresham’s law).

Parsimony in science

Parsimony is considered a desirable or even necessary characteristic of a scientific theory but what this means is not clear. There are many types of parsimony (see the article on Simplicity in the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy for a list). The most common kind of parsimony is qualitative parsimony, often called Ockham’s Razor, which says that new kinds of entities should not be posited if possible.

Qualitative parsimony privileges atomistic and evolutionary theories since they posit only one kind of atom (with many combinations) and one kind of life (with many variations). This seems arbitrary without further justification. Perhaps Thales has this in mind when he asserted that everything is water in some form. In terms of classification, “lumpers” dominate under qualitative parsimony.

Another kind of parsimony in science is quantitative parsimony, which says that the number of entities should be minimal. By itself this would privilege a theory that posited many classes of entities but few in each class. In short, “splitters” dominate under quantitative parsimony. But quantitative parsimony is rarely mentioned and sometimes even denied.

It would be most fair to accept both types of parsimony, which may be traded off against one another. If a new kind of entity requires many fewer entities, should it not be preferable to positing more entities? And if a small number of additional entities requires fewer kinds of entity, should this not be preferable to positing more kinds of entities?

One way to look at this is that entities, kinds of entities, etc., are explanatory resources that are not unlimited. The best explanation is one that optimally uses explanatory resources. Just as classifications are best that minimize within-class differences and maximize between-class differences, so an optimal approach to explanation is best.

What before how

One way to express realism is that it insists on knowing what before knowing how. Why is that? Because for a realist ontology precedes epistemology, which means being precedes knowing. Something is, whether we know it or not.

A question students are asked is, If a tree fell in the forest and no one knew it, would it still have fallen? The realist answers Yes. So if we come upon a tree on the ground in the forest, what happened? We are entitled to investigate how the tree got on the ground after we have ascertained that the tree is on the ground.

This is not obvious to anti-realists, who want to know how something got there before they will agree that it is there. Appearances after all can be deceiving. If we can trace a chain of events that leads from the tree growing up, dying, and then falling on the ground, then we can be sure that there is a tree on the ground. Otherwise, maybe not.

One reason anti-realists are attracted to evolutionary theories is that they (purportedly) tell us how things got here. Now exactly what it is that got here may still be fuzzy. After all, evolutionists haven’t figured out exactly what a species is, but they are certain that whatever a species is, it got here by evolution.

Realists on the other hand want to be confident that something called a species really exists before investigating how a species came to be. Before the 19th century it was widely understood that species were created and so had exactly the properties with which they were endowed by their Creator (to use the phrase of the Declaration of Independence, 1776). This is what motivated early modern science to explore the world the Creator had made.

After Darwin, the certainty about what things really are decreased even as the confidence about how things came to be increased. The identity crisis is an invention of the evolutionary mindset. Meanwhile realists are waiting for anti-realists to figure out who they are so a real dialogue is possible.