iSoul In the beginning is reality

Sex and marriage

Human beings certainly have a greater variation of behavior than other kinds of organisms but that should not obscure the existence of norms. The norm for human beings is monogamy: a marriage of one man and one woman. The existence of variations from that norm and failures to adhere to the norm do not invalidate the norm. Monogamy is rooted in biological, social, historical, legal, religious, and moral realities. There is nothing unfair or unjust about monogamy. It is fully justified, rational, and moral.

‘Sexual’ is a biological term that refers to the way a species reproduces. Sexual reproduction means reproduction by two members of a species who are of different types (called sexes), one male and one female. Other animal species also reproduce sexually. Some plants are asexual, meaning each member has the means to reproduce alone.

The term ‘heterosexual’ is a redundancy. ‘Hetero’ means ‘other’ or ‘different’ but that is just what sexual reproduction means so ‘heterosexual’ means the same as ‘sexual’. The term ‘homosexual’ is a contradiction in terms. ‘Homo’ means ‘same’ so ‘homosexual’ would mean reproduction by two members of the same sex, which is not sexual reproduction. So it is self-contradictory or means something like ‘anti-sexual’.

Polygamy is a primitive form of marriage that allows more than one man and/or more than one woman in marriage. So-called same-sex marriage is thus a form of polygamy. This is not progress–it is a turn toward primitive ways. Since marriage is foundational for societies, this indicates that modern societies are betting the farm on sexual tomfoolery.

Apparent age

If someone from an isolated, technologically undeveloped culture sees an electronic gadget, they may think this took a long time to make.  Does the gadget have apparent age?  No, someone is merely ignorant of how it was made.

Similarly, Adam and the original creation did not have apparent age.  Some people may be ignorant of how Adam was created but that does not make him older than he is.  It is a question of knowledge vs. ignorance, not actual vs. apparent age.

Natural kinds

Natural science is based on the premise that natural kinds exist, that is, types of entities with common, fixed characteristics called natures.  The natural world is the combination and interaction of all natural kinds.  Philosophically, this is a form of essentialism.

Naturalism is the position that the natural world is all that natural science can acknowledge (or all that exists).  This would exclude the origin of natural kinds from scientific consideration.  Christians (should) believe that all natural kinds were created by God.

Elemental naturalism is the additional premise that all natural kinds are minimal elements such as atoms, forces, chemical elements, genes, etc.  Universal elemental naturalism is the additional premise that the only real natural kinds are the most elemental kinds and everything else is derivable from these.  Evolutionary naturalism is a form of universal elemental naturalism in which the most elemental kinds plus deep time result in the present natural world.

Relational mechanics

The book “Relational Mechanics and Implementation of Mach’s Principle with Weber’s Gravitational Force” (2014) is by Andre Koch Torres Assis.  A bound copy is available through Amazon and a pdf is online at http://www.ifi.unicamp.br/~assis/Relational-Mechanics-Mach-Weber.pdf. Recall “Mach’s Principle”: Newton’s concepts of absolute space and time were not accepted by all scientists and the call for a reformulation of mechanics in terms of purely relational quantities never stopped. Although Mach was not the first who insisted on such a reformulation, he was the most influential one and his critique of the Newtonian concepts of absolute space and time published in his “Mechanics” was later loosely termed “Mach’s principle” by Einstein. However, since Mach made only tentative proposals, there are various interpretations and formulations of this principle.

After a thorough review of classical and relativistic mechanics and their problems, the author introduces relational mechanics based on his formulation of Mach’s Principle. He says in the Preface: Relational mechanics is a quantitative implementation of the ideas of Leibniz, Berkeley and Mach utilizing Weber’s force for gravitation. It is based only on relational concepts such as the distance between material bodies, the relative radial velocity between them and the relative radial acceleration between them. Several scientists took part in its development, including Wilhelm Weber himself and Erwin Schrödinger. The goal of this book is to present the properties and characteristics of this new physics, together with the main aspects related to its historical development after Newton. In this way relational mechanics can be seen in a broad perspective. A great emphasis is given to Newton’s bucket experiment. When a bucket partially filled with water remains stationary in the ground, the water surface is observed to remain horizontal. When the bucket and the water rotate together relative to the ground around the bucket’s axis with a constant angular velocity, the surface of the water is observed to become concave, higher at the sides of the bucket than along the its axis. This is one of the simplest experiments ever performed in physics. Despite this fact no other experiment had so deep and influential consequences upon the foundations of mechanics. We place it at the same level Galileo’s experimental discovery that all bodies fall freely towards the ground with a constant acceleration, no matter their weights or chemical compositions. The explanation of these two facts without utilizing the concepts of absolute space or inertia, but taking into account the gravitational influence exerted by the distant galaxies in these two experiments, is one of the major achievements of relational mechanics.

He supports a universe in dynamical equilibrium without expansion but doesn’t go into that as much as other topics.

He notes in the Conclusion: We have found a complete equivalence between ptolemaic and copernican world systems. It is then equally valid to say that the Earth is spinning once a day relative to the stationary set of distant galaxies, or that the Earth is at rest while the set of distant galaxies is rotating once a day as a whole relative to the Earth. Both world views are now equivalent not only kinematically or visually, but also dynamically (yielding the same flattening of the Earth at the poles, the same precession of the plane of oscillation of Foucault’s pendulum relative to the ground, etc.) We have deduced the fact that all inertial forces of newtonian mechanics, like the centrifugal or Coriolis forces, are real forces acting on the test body and being exerted by the set of galaxies. These forces have a gravitational origin and appear when there is a relative rotation between the test body and the set of galaxies. This property explained the flattening of the Earth as being due to the relative rotation between the Earth and the set of galaxies. This property also justifies the fact that the plane of oscillation of Foucault’s pendulum at the North or South poles remains at rest relative to the set of galaxies, while the Earth is spinning relative to the galaxies. In the terrestrial frame of reference, on the other hand, the Coriolis force exerted gravitationally by the set of galaxies and acting on the mass connected to the pendulum rotates the plane of oscillation of the pendulum, relative to the ground. This Coriolis force causes a precession in the plane of oscillation of the pendulum, making it rotate together with the set of galaxies around the North-South axis of the Earth.

Law and chance

The last few centuries have seen a number of theories of history which tried to make history a science and tried to articulate laws of history, including natural history.  All of these have failed to find anything like a physical law.  Natural history was treated as a science with “principles” substituting for fixed laws.  The evolutionary paradigm supplied a theme and a mindset of progress but still no laws.  Darwin tried to make survival into a law but it’s really a form of happenstance–Darwinism is not law and chance but chance and chance.  Population thinking is in the opposite direction from law thinking.

A genuine science of nature would have laws that abstract from experience and are invariably true.  Those who believed in the existence of such laws in the 19th century were called “idealists” which did not mean philosophical or political idealism but the belief that there was an overall plan of creation, for example, that was shown in a harmonious taxonomic system.  Unfortunately, these people either died out or were co-opted by an acceptance of “designed evolution”, an early form of theistic evolution.  (See Peter Bowler’s Darwinism and the Argument from Design, Journal of the History of Biology, vol. 10, no. 1).

Scientists should be looking for a system of nature (recall that Linnaeus’ work was called Systema Naturae).  Evolutionists focus on the population and species level; they refuse to look for a larger system.  Common descent is not a system, it’s happenstance.  The real ‘law’ of evolution is that there are no laws of biology–things just happen and can only be described with an eye toward the possible.

The idealist approach, which emphasizes the timeless plan of creation that is still observable today, can and should be revived.  Scientists should seek physical laws, which despite chance noise are the scientific way to understand nature.  Ironically, Monod was right that science is about law and chance but apart from physics and chemistry, necessary laws are lacking in science today.

Naïveté and skepticism

There is a dualism between naïveté and skepticism.  In ancient and medieval times there was a kind of skepticism about science.  Zeno’s paradoxes for example questioned whether or not motion was real.  Logic was refined to a high degree in the middle ages but was used for abstruse philosophical and theological matters rather than for practical knowledge.  On the other hand, the histories of the ancient and medieval times were quite naïve.  They were often interspersed with mythological and legendary tales so that moderns tend to dismiss them all.

An inversion occurred in the early modern period, culminating in the Enlightenment.  Since then, skeptical or critical history has been the norm.  Ancient documents such as the Bible are examined with great skepticism.  On the other hand, science gets accepted without question.  Especially those in the divinity or humanities schools who don’t understand science are inclined to accept whatever the scientists say–they are quite naïve about science.  Many scientists are skeptical about anything non-science, with a curious naïveté about the history of science.  A history of science written by scientists is always a Whig history (the good guys are on the side that turns out “right” and the bad guys are on the side that turns out “wrong” where right and wrong are defined by current science).  Historians keep trying to set the record straight but modern prejudices are as strong in their own way as ancient and medieval prejudices.

Where does this leave us?  First, we should examine ourselves.  Are we being overly skeptical in one area and naïve in another area?  Second, we should seek a balance between a healthy use of our critical faculties without falling into skepticism and a healthy acceptance of things that we don’t fully understand without being naïve.

 

The concept of miracle

Theologian Wolfhart Pannenberg made some good points in a short article on miracles; see excerpt below:

In the modern history of the dispute between scientists or philosophers calling upon the authority of science on the one hand and Christian theologians on the other, the concept of miracle has become one of the more intricate problems, because miracles are said to involve a violation of the laws of nature, as David Hume asserted in the section on miracles in his Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding (1748). This is a self-defeating notion of miracle, of course, because the logic of the concept of natural law requires that there be no exceptions–otherwise the pretended law in question would turn out not to be truly a law of nature. The concept of miracle as a violation of natural law subverts the very concept of law and in effect exposes the futility of the assertion of miracles.

This is not the meaning of the concept of miracle in Christian theology, however. In the biblical writings, the word miracle refers to extraordinary events that function as “signs” of God’s sovereign power. Therefore, the biblical language often speaks of “signs and wonders’ (Daniel 6:27; John4:48). A wonder, or miracle, is basically an unusual–in fact, extraordinary–event. Augustine said, “Whatever is unusual, is a miracle”…. Explicitly he emphasized that events of that type do not occur contrary to the nature of things. To us they may appear contrary, because of our limited knowledge of the “course of nature.” But God’s point of view is different, because he is the Creator of the nature of things as well as of the events that appear unusual to us. …

In medieval theology the conception of miracles changes, because the nature of things was now conceived of objectively, not in relation to the limitations of our knowledge. …

Later, the view of miracles as occurring contra naturam [against nature] became more generally accepted, as did a concept of nature and of the order of nature based on human experience. This development finally led to the idea that a miracle is a violation of the laws of nature.

The concept of miracle in the Augustinian sense of the term, then, does not involve any opposition to the order of nature described in terms of natural law. It only requires us to admit that we do not know everything about how the processes of nature work.

Zygon, vol.37, no.3 (Sept. 2002), 759-762

 

Psychological Types of Myers, Briggs, and Jung

The typology of Myers, Briggs, and Jung is best known via the MBTI, the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator. This test can be considered separately from the Jung-Myers-Briggs (JMB) typology that it’s based on. First let’s consider the JMB typology, and then the MBTI.

The JMB typology developed from Carl Jung’s 1921 monograph Psychological Types (The Collected Works of C. G. Jung, Vol. 6), which he developed for use with depth psychology. Isabel Briggs Myers and her mother, Katharine Briggs, expanded Jung’s typology and adapted it for their test, the MBTI, in 1942.

Jung distinguished two general attitude types, extroversion and introversion, and four function types: thinking, feeling, sensation, and intuition. This resulted in eight psychological types, which Jung described mainly from literary examples.

Myers and Briggs modified Jung’s concept of intuition somewhat, which Jung had described as the “function that allows us to see around the corner of the future,” like hunches. Myers and Briggs emphasized that intuition involves the ability to recognize patterns and possibilities.

Read more →

Creation and evolution typology

The first issue that arises in developing a typology for ideas about creation and evolution are the terms themselves: they are sufficiently ambiguous that their meaning differs even by the same author in the same work. This can be part of a fallacy of equivocation or it can simply mean the terms are general and should not be expected to carry a technical meaning unless that is specified. Let’s take the latter path and use them as general terms.

Some authors promote creation only whereas others promote evolution only but there are other ways of speaking. Some speak of creation by evolution which means evolution but a Creator is given credit for it. Others speak of evolution by creation which means progressive creation but evolution is given credit for it. These are categorized under evolution and creation, respectively.

Further, creation used to mean static creation, that is, life, the earth, and the universe were created in a state that has not significantly changed. Also, evolution used to mean only gradual evolution, that is, life, the earth, and the universe have changed gradually but drastically over a long period of time.

Others combine creation and evolution in a kind of partnership. Creation with evolution makes creation primary but acknowledges something like evolution within created limits. This dynamic creation differs from the older conception of a purely static creation. Evolution with creation applies to others who make evolution primary but acknowledge something like creation within evolutionary limits. Evolution with large catastrophic or saltational changes differs from the older conception of a purely gradual evolution.

So we have six possibilities under the two headings of creation and evolution:

1. Creation  (e.g., static creation) 4. Evolution (e.g., gradual evolution)
2. Creation with evolution (e.g., dynamic creation) 5. Evolution with creation (e.g., saltational evolution)
3. Evolution by creation (e.g., progressive creation) 6. Creation by evolution (e.g., theistic evolution)

Of these six, 1, 2, and 3 acknowledge an explicit Creator but 4, 5, and 6 consider a Creator to be undetectable even if acknowledged (as in 6). All but 1 have some form of evolution in the general sense of the word. All but 4 have some form of creation in the general sense of the word.

So creation and evolution are general concepts that can work together in different conceptual schemes. The question is not “creation or evolution” but how much of each one and which came first? It’s easy to see how creation could come first; it’s harder to see how evolution could. The standard retort is that abiogenesis (the beginning of evolutionary life) is a different subject from evolutionary biology but that does not answer how evolution could start. Stephen Meyer’s book Signature in the Cell is a further challenge to the view that evolution could come first.

November 2010

The nature of creation

‘Nature’ is the world conceived without reference to God. A natural rock is a rock as if it exists on its own or as part of a world that exists on its own. It has no absolute origin. Its only ‘origin’ is from other rocks, other existing substances. It is all transformation. This presupposes a metaphysics of materialism.

‘Creation’ is the world conceived as made by God from nothing & dependent on God for its continuation. Something of the nature of creation can be gained from the attributes of God. We can expect orderliness for God is a God of order. We can expect some reflection of purpose for God surely had a purpose in creating the world.

‘Natural history’ is history (conceived with reference to God and) with particular reference to the non-human world.

Creationists do not ‘add God’ to the natural world. There is no natural world without God. Creationists take off the blinders of naturalism that prevent the acknowledgement of the reality of God.

The laws of nature are conceived by naturalists as laws without a legislator. The laws of nature are conceived by creationists as laws created by God. They are laws of creation.

Naturalistic science is sometimes considered merely methodologically naturalistic because it avoids ontological commitments rather than affirming an ontological naturalistic universe. This is a sham. There is nothing to recommend ontological minimalism beyond an academic exercise. Moreover, the results of naturalistic science are presented as conclusions about reality, not merely conditional products subject to further vetting by others.

A naturalistic science needs to justify why there are not chaotic, non-causal events. It has excluded these arbitrarily. It promotes deterministic states arbitrarily. It is open from below, not above.

2008